Q. How did you feel after the Challenger disaster in 1986 and the Columbia disaster in 2003?
Wakata participating in the development testing of repair of the Shuttle’s heat-resistant tiles, in order to resume flights following the Columbia disaster (courtesy: NASA)
The Space Shuttle is a spaceship that gave humankind a more intimate connection with space flight, but it has also taught us that sending humans into space involves taking great risks. After the Challenger disaster in 1986, Space Shuttles were grounded for about two-and-a-half years while NASA investigated the cause of the accident and took actions to improve flight safety, and subsequently, a lot of people may have felt that there would be no more major accidents. However, the Columbia disaster in 2003 reminded us of the dangers. These accidents made me realize the importance of having a safe initial design and sticking to the operational limitations that the vehicle design stipulates.
For example, your car may give you a sign that it has a problem before it breaks down, like if the engine starts to make an abnormal vibration while you’re driving. I felt that being able to sense this sort of mechanical anomaly before a major breakdown occurs is an essential part of operational safety of any machine, including the Space Shuttle. In fact, the damage to the heat-resistant tiles had already been identified after the previous Shuttle missions had returned to the Earth, but nobody thought this would lead to a catastrophic accident. The Columbia accident taught us that when structural damage or a sub-system failure occurs which the system’s original design did not foresee, there is no guarantee of operational safety unless the root cause of the problem is clearly understood and the necessary countermeasure actions are taken in order to prevent re-occurrence of the problem.
At the same time, I got a sense of the strong commitment and support of the American people in pursuit of human space exploration. They did not give up in their goal to explore the frontier in space after the Space Shuttle tragedies; instead, they took on the challenge of returning the Space Shuttle to flight. I felt that the Americans could clearly see the importance of continuing the space program as the world’s leader in that endeavor. Although there is no such thing as a 100-percent safe spacecraft, and there are risks involved, we have more to gain than to lose by going into space. Human space flight has had and continues to have many benefits.
Q. Your colleague Soichi Noguchi flew in 2005 on the first Space Shuttle mission after the Columbia disaster. What were your thoughts about that mission?
Orbiter Boom Sensor System checking for damage on the Space Shuttle (courtesy: NASA)
When Soichi Noguchi went on this first post-Columbia mission (STS-114), the crew used the newly developed Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS). I participated on its design project team as a representative of the NASA Astronaut Office. The OBSS is an on-orbit inspection system with cameras and sensors that check for damage on the Space Shuttle’s Thermal Protection System. STS-114 was the first time this brand-new device was going to be used in orbit. My colleague Soichi Noguchi had the very important job of leading the spacewalks during the flight. Obviously, NASA had to vastly improve the safety of flying the Space Shuttle before resuming flights because without the Shuttle, the ISS assembly could not have been continued.
Columbia was lost during atmospheric re-entry on its way back to Florida because of damage on the left wing’s leading edge Thermal Protection System which was caused by insulation foam that had fallen off the external fuel tank during launch. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board had recommended that measures be taken so the insulation would not fall off again, that NASA develop the ability to detect damage to the Thermal Protection System while in orbit, and that it find a way to repair damage that would pose a danger during re-entry while the Shuttle was still in orbit. NASA then developed the OBSS.
After STS-114 launched, NASA confirmed that some foam insulation had fallen off the external fuel tank during ascent. Photos of the Shuttle’s thermal protection systems were taken by the ISS crewmembers before docking, and the Shuttle crew used the OBSS to conduct a scheduled inspection of both wings’ leading edge as well as the nose cone areas of the Orbiter. Based on the photographs taken by the ISS crewmembers, we indentified where the insulation foam had struck on the bottom side of the Orbiter so we needed to conduct an unscheduled focused inspection of the damaged area using the OBSS. Before the STS-114 crew woke up the morning of the focused inspection, the OBSS and robotics team stayed up late working out the procedure so that by the following morning, the operating crew had instructions on what to do. The Mission Control Center in Houston closely monitored and supported the crew operation during the focused inspection. As this flight was the first time the OBSS was used on orbit, the OBSS ground support team was extremely busy with short sleeping hours during the flight. Thanks to the great teamwork of the flight crew and the ground support team, we were able to successfully complete the on-orbit inspection as well as repair the damage of the Shuttle’s Thermal Protection System. It was a valuable experience for me to be part of the development and operation team of the OBSS contributing to the improvement of the safety of Space Shuttle flights.